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Postponing Maternity in Ireland
*
 
As in many other developed countries, Ireland in recent decades has experienced a 
postponement of maternity. In this paper we consider the main trends in this phenomenon, 
considering changes in first and later births separately. We adapt the theoretical model due 
to Walker (1995) to incorporate a declining marginal return to experience to provide a human 
capital/career planning explanation for this postponement. We estimate a hazard model 
based upon the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey to empirically test this model. The career-
planning hypothesis was found to hold. However an assumption about perfect capital 
markets failed indicating the impact of an income effect on the timing of maternity. The model 
also identified the importance of cohort differences in the timing of marriage in explaining 
much of the inter-cohort specific differences in the timing of maternity. 
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errors. 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Although Ireland has traditionally been categorized as a high fertility country, in 
recent decades there has been a large decline in the fertility rate. In 1965, the total 
fertility rate (TFR), in Ireland was about 4 compared with an EU15 average of 
about 2.7 (Eurostat, 2002). In the last number of decades, as in most other western 
countries, the birth rate has fallen in Ireland, so that the TFR by 1995 was 1.82, 
rising slightly over the remainder of the last decade to 1.98 in 2000. In 
O’Donoghue and O’Shea (2006), we described the factors influencing fertility 
rate by birth order. Part of the explanation for the birth decline has been a delay in 
maternity. In this paper we consider this issue in more detail. 
In table 1 we describe some of the main demographic trends in fertility between 
1965 and 2000. We notice that the mean age at first birth has risen from 25.2 in 
1975 to 27.8 in 2000. Comparing period with cohort effects, we see the earlier 
decline in mean age at first birth to a low of below 25 for the cohort born 1945-55 
before rising for later cohorts. However, the rise highlighted by the period effect 
has been recent and so it has not been captured in the cohort effect yet. While 
delaying first births, families have also been reducing their total number of births; 
accounting for less than 43% of births in 1965, first and second births have risen 
to over 71 per cent in 2000. In 1965 over 40% of births were fourth or later 
children (in fact one third were fifth order or higher), while by 2000 this 
accounted only for about 12% of births.  
While the overall decline in the fertility rate (from a TFR of 4.03 in 1965 to 1.42 
in 1995) has resulted in a fall in the fertility rate across all age groups (See the age 
specific fertility rates in figure 1), the postponement of maternity has seen the 
fertility rate of older age groups overtake the fertility rate of younger age groups. 
By the mid-1990’s the 30-34 age group had taken over as the age group with the 
highest fertility rate from the 25-29 age group. The fertility rate of the 35-39 age-
group has also surpassed that of the 20-24 age group.  
As outlined in O’Donoghue and O’Shea (2006), other than the impact of 
progressive taxation on human capital accumulation, the tax-benefit policy 
environment in Ireland is unlikely to have a strong effect on birth decisions as 
child related policy is quite limited. The policy reform with the likelihood of 
having the strongest effect has been the belated liberalization of contraceptive 
laws. Until the 1973 Supreme Court judgment, relating to the importation of 
contraceptives for personal use, the use of artificial contraception methods was 
illegal. The 1979 Family Planning Act made contraceptives available on 
prescription through pharmacists and the 1985 Act removed the requirement to 
seek authorization from doctors. In 1993, remaining restrictions on their sale were 
removed. Abortion remains illegal in Ireland, however significant numbers travel 
to the UK for this procedure. The liberalization of the contraceptive laws in 
Ireland during the 1980’s, allowing fertility to be controlled more and thus 
facilitating fertility to be delayed.  
  2The period since Ireland joined the European Union in the early 1970’s has seen 
large economic changes. While the late 1990’s have seen high growth rates, much 
of the period of under analysis (1970-1994) has occurred during periods of high 
unemployment. The male unemployment rate (see Figure 2c) rose from about 6% 
in the early 1970s to a peak in 19% in the mid 1980’s falling during the 1990’s to 
4% in 2000. The upward trend in unemployment coincided with the start of the 
postponement of maternity in the early 1980’s (Figure 2a). This corresponds with 
Ahn and Mira’s (1999) finding of pro-cyclical fertility. Unemployment has in part 
been concentrated amongst young workers (15-24) who have had in the period an 
unemployment rate of about 50% higher than the average. This is likely to have 
influenced marriage and fertility decisions, delaying the fertility of the 20 to 30 
age group.  
At the same time as the rise in unemployment rates, education levels have been 
rising (See Figure 2b), resulting in an increase in the age leaving education from 
about 16 for women born in 1940’s to 18 for those born in the early 1970’s. 
Rising education levels tend to delay fertility for reasons outlined in the next 
section.  
In table 2 we decompose the trend in mean age at first birth by education level as 
reported in the Living in Ireland Survey 1994. The average age at first birth as 
calculated compares well with that calculated using official statistics.  Putting the 
Irish trend in an international context, we compare with results contained in 
Gustafsson et al, (2001) study of the postponement of maternity in Britain, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.  
Overall the trend in Ireland follows the U-shaped pattern found in the other 
countries. Average age at first birth in the 1950’s and 1960’s fell to a low point in 
the 1970’s and 1980’s before rising in the 1990’s. Typically the average age 
increases with education level. Those with high education had the biggest average 
postponement in maternity between the 1970’s and 1990’s.  The lowest average 
age at first birth occurred for those with high education in the 1970’s, while the 
lowest point occurred for lower and medium educated women in the 1980’s. This 
pattern follows in part the trend in age at marriage, which historically has been 
high by international standards (Coleman, 1992), having fallen in the 1970’s and 
has risen subsequently. This trend occurred slightly later in Ireland than in the 
other countries considered where the low points occurred in the 1960’s in Britain 
and Sweden, the 1970’s in East and West Germany and have risen since the 
1950’s in the Netherlands.  
However although the pattern of delayed maternity is similar in Ireland, the level 
is higher. Until the 1980’s average age at first birth in Ireland was higher than in 
the other countries, being surpassed at this point by the Netherlands and in the 
1990’s by Western Germany. The average age at first birth remained lower in the 
other countries. In general this is a pattern replicated for low and medium 
education levels, however for high education levels from the 1980’s Ireland had a 
lower average age at first birth than for all countries except East Germany. 
  3We also notice that during the increase in average age at first birth between the 
1980’s and 1990’s is not simply due to a compositional shift from low education 
to higher education as the age at first birth rose for all education groups. The rise 
is highest for those with upper secondary education, with both this group and the 
higher educated group exceeding 1960’s average age at first birth by the early 
1990’s. In general however, in the other countries, it is the higher educated who 
delayed maternity the most over the period. 
In table 3 we report the mean age of later births in Ireland. The trends are similar 
to first births with again a U-shaped pattern with a low point in the 1970’s for 
high educated women and the 1980’s for low and medium educated women. The 
average gap between first and second and second and third births for all education 
levels and across time has risen gradually over time from a gap of about 1.5 years 
in the 1950’s to an average gap of about 2.5 years in the 1990’s. The gap between 
third and fourth births has fallen to some extent. This is partly a selection issue as 
the proportion having fourth births has fallen. Nevertheless much of the driving 
force in the increasing average age is due to the knock on effect of later earlier 
births.  
In this paper we will now go on to consider the factors that have influenced the 
postponement of maternity over the period 1970-1994. In the next section, we 
consider the theoretical background to economic explanations of duration to first 
birth and later births. Section 3 describes the data used. In section 4 we report a 
descriptive analysis of differential duration to births and in section 5, we estimate 
empirical models of duration to birth. In section 6, utilizing the empirical models 
estimated in section 5, we consider the driving factors behind the delay in fertility. 
Section 7 concludes.  
2.  THE MODEL 
As we saw above, the average age at first birth has increased in Ireland. Here we 
consider some of the reasons provided by economic theory for these changes. 
Gustafsson, (2002) cite two principle reasons given by Hotz et al., (1997) for the 
general postponement of first birth in Western countries; the consumption 
smoothing and women’s career planning motives. The consumption-smoothing 
motive relates to having enough resources to afford having a child, while the 
career-planning motive refers to the need to have the time for child caring and 
rearing.  
Greater education participation can cause a delay in births because being in 
education can be incompatible with having children, for financial and life-style 
reasons. Moreover, after leaving education, highly educated women are likely to 
spend more time in investment in job search and in finding the right job. There is 
also a positive correlation between investment in schooling and investment in on 
the job training, both of which combine to provide higher wages for educated 
women (Gustafsson, 2001). This results in those with higher education levels 
tending to have higher growth in earnings in the years immediately following 
education. Therefore more highly educated women may wish to delay having a 
  4child until a stable and desired career pattern has been established. A third reason 
for career planning delaying maternity described by Gustafsson et al. is attitude. 
For example a low educated woman may try to fit market work around family 
responsibilities, while more educated women may try to have children when lower 
labour supply such as a maternity break or part-time work will have least effect on 
her career. 
The opportunity cost of having children and caring for them is, therefore, is also 
higher for educated women, both in the short-term and in the long-term. 
Consequently, increased education is an important factor contributing to the 
postponement of maternity. Countries with marked increases in higher education 
tend to be highly correlated with the countries having the most pronounced delays 
in the mean age at first birth. (Kohler et al, 2002).  
In this paper we utilise a variant of Walker’s (1995) model of fertility. Our life-
cycle model depends upon the utility from consumption (xt) and utility from from 
the number of children (nt) at times t across the lifetime from 0 to T. The number 
of children (nt) at time t depends upon the fertility at different points in time. The 
model assumes no bequest motive and assumes that consumer preferences are 
inter-temporally and contemporaneously strongly separable. At time t discounted 
future utility is: 
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At each time t the mother has a time endowment scaled to 1 divided into labour 
market activity  , schooling  and childcare  , where a child at 
age j requires the proportion  of the year of care. In this model we assume that 
either schooling or labour market activity can occur at a particular point but not 
both. Summing over the number of children in a family at time t, total childcare 
demanded is: 
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where M is the age of adulthood or independence of the child from their parents. 
The total monetary expenditure to produce child services ( ) t n g  is defined as the 
sum of direct expenditures   and childcare costs   . 
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Total income at time t is the mother’s income from labour yf,t and the husband’s 
income from labour  .   t m, y
() u y − 1
k
We incorporate economic instability in our model through the inclusion of the 
unemployment rate ut at each time t. Hence, expected male earnings are 
. As most working age males work full-time in Ireland, we assume that 
father’s work full-time, ignoring labour supply effects. We allow female labour 
supply (h
t t m,
t) to vary. Hence total female labour income at time t is labour supply 
times the wage rate ( ):  t w
t t t f w h y = ,           ( 4 )  
The wage rate of the woman (in equation 5) positively depends upon the human 
capital accumulation   from on the job experience (h t t) and schooling (st) at time 
t, so that both coefficients (µ1 and µ3) are positive, and also on the market rental 
rate of human capital  t ω . As the rate of return to experience falls with experience, 
we incorporate the square of experience with a negative coefficient  (µ2), to 
produce the typical age-earnings profile. We incorporate in our model, the 
assumption that human capital depreciates during periods out of the labour force 
for caring for children, where the coefficient (µ4) is negative.
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Where pt is the price of the composite good xt the life-cycle budget constraint for 
the family can be defined as
33: 
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      ( 6 )  
The model therefore assumes perfect capital markets (PCM) (See Hotz et al, 
1997; Happel et al., 1984 and Gustafsson, 2001) where the budget constraint 
balances over the lifetime and resources can be saved or borrowed from the 
future.  
 
2 We do not incorporate here the “rebound” effect of human capital appreciating more rapidly for a 
while after re-entering the labour market (See Mincer and  Ofek, 1982). 
3 Given the limited child related social policies pursued in Ireland, we ignore the impact of public 
policy in the definition of our budget constraint. 
  6The optimization problem therefore becomes 
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The first order conditions are: 
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where  λ is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the lifetime budget 
constraint, or the marginal utility of wealth and  ( ) v′  is the derivative of   with 
respect to   . π
() v
nt t is the full present value of the opportunity cost of childbearing in 
period t and is defined as: 
       
        	 

 	    
   	   







































w b c c h m
∑∑ ∑














































2 δ φ µ µ µ
δ φ δ φ δ δ π
    (9) 
The terms can be described as follows: 
A.  Direct expenditure for the child at different ages until aged M.  
B.  Direct childcare expenditure for the hours worked by the mother for each 
of the dependent years.  
C.  The reduction in non-parental childcare expenditure for other children due 
to having more than one child.  
D.  The cost of parental childcare for the child. 
E.  The foregone human capital due to rearing the child.  
  7Transforming (8b) we get the following and defining , the 
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This describes how fertility is allocated across the life-cycle, relating the price a 
woman is willing to pay to transfer fertility between periods, while the right hand 
side of the equation is the price available in the market to transfer fertility between 
years. Ignoring the wealth effect, the greater this ratio, the greater the opportunity 
cost of having a child in the future and so births will be had earlier. The steeper 
the profile of the opportunity cost therefore, the earlier the birth is expected to be.  
Economic models of labour supply behaviour predict that higher educational 
attainment and wage rates for women lead to higher labour supply. The impact of 
the increased labour supply impacts on the shadow price of a child through term B 
due to the cost of childcare, increasing the cost of a child. However the existence 
of more children, through the term C in the shadow price reduces the price, due to 
positive economies of scale in childcare. Although increased labour supply may 
increase the cost of child-care, if we assume that childcare costs are constant over 
time relative to earnings, then this term will have little effect on the substitution 
effect, but rather will influence fertility decisions through the lifetime income 
effect. However where capital markets are imperfect, where the ability to borrow 
is limited, then the cost of child-care may influence the decision of when to have a 
child. 
Term D indicates that the higher the wage rate, the higher the opportunity cost for 
caring for new children in the short-term. Also because wages tend to increase 
with experience, the later a birth comes in the life-cycle, the higher the wages and 
thus the greater the opportunity cost of having a child. This relates to Cigno’s 
(1991) model that predicts that those with higher pre-parental human capital will 
have children sooner. Therefore the opportunity cost of parental childcare is lower 
at an earlier age and so there is an incentive to have a child earlier.  
However the direction of this effect is counter-balanced by the future human 
capital loss due to parental childcare (term E). If a parent reduces or stops work to 
care for a child, then they will have lower human capital in future years, reducing 
their future earnings. The human capital loss results from a number of factors. 
There is a higher human capital loss, (a) the higher the wage rate; (b) the greater 
the future labour supply; (c) the greater the period spent in parental childcare due 
both to the loss of human capital relative to not caring for children (µ1) and due to 
the depreciation of human capital (µ4) that occurs during periods out of the labour 
market; (d) The negative coefficient of experience squared in the wage equation 
(µ2), reduces the per annum loss in human capital as experience increases.  These 
effects however are contained largely in both  t π and  1 + t π , regardless of the timing 
of the birth and so in themselves do not influence the substitution effect. 
  8What drives the impact of future human capital loss on the substitution effect is 
the impact of the fact of the later the birth the less time that remains between the 
time of birth, t and the end of the working life, T. Therefore, the later the birth, the 
lower the cost in terms of human capital loss. If future human capital losses fall at 
a faster rate than the opportunity cost of parental child-care increases, then the 
total cost due to both effects will fall over time, producing an incentive to have 
births later.  
However neither the uncertainty effect due to unemployment rate nor the income 
effect due to a husband’s income influence the opportunity cost ratio and so do 
not influence the timing of birth. The model therefore ignores the consumption 
smoothing hypothesis. The income and uncertainty effects only impact on the 
lifetime decision about the total number of births.  
3.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1  Data 
In this paper we utilise the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey, the Irish component of 
the European Community Household Panel Survey, to investigate the strength of 
the different forces on fertility trends. The survey contains substantial cross-
section information on employment and demographic characteristics in 1993-
1994. The 1994 wave also contained additional retrospective information on 
fertility, partnership formation, parental history and employment status. The event 
history data allows us to utilise variables that describe the duration in a number of 
dimensions; since last birth, marriage, and since leaving education.  
It would have been desirable to have historical panel data or at least detailed 
employment event history data. However the retrospective employment history 
data available is imperfect. Nevertheless in the majority of cases it was possible to 
identify full histories. For a minority of cases (8.5% of women and 3.5% of their 
spouses), some imputations were necessary. For simplification purposes and 
because recall information is expressed in years, spells have been rounded to the 
nearest year.  
In this study we focus on marital births as during the period we are focusing on, 
non-marital births accounted only for a small proportion of all births. In the 
original sample of women, we produce a panel data set of 25 years from 1970-
1994 comprising a total of 58938 observations for 3235 married women. In the 
subset of women whose histories we can identify, we have 38803 observations for 
3043 married women, while in the subset whose spouse’s history we can identify, 
we have 31027 observations for 2237 married women. 
3.2  Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
We use a modelling method based upon survival analysis in this paper. Survival 
analysis is concerned with modelling the hazard of an event z at time t, h(t,z(t)), 
the probability of an event at time t having survived until time t. We utilise a Cox 
  9proportional hazard model (see Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980), where the hazard 
takes the form: 








i ix t h t z t h t z t h β β exp exp , 0 0      ( 1 0 )  
Here  represents the baseline hazard at time t, or the hazard function for the 
mean individual in the sample, 
() t h0
( ) t z  is a vector of time-varying and time-
unvarying explanatory variables or covariates, with β  the estimated parameters.  
We utilise this model in turn to estimate the factors that influence the hazard of a 
first second, third and fourth births. One needs to be cautious about the results of 
this method as estimating each birth interval separately as outlined in Heckman 
and Walker (1990), may produce biased estimates. Heckman and Walker use 
instead a joint approach in order to capture to some extent individual 
heterogeneity. Individual heterogeneity may represent to some degree individual 
differences in fecundity or general biological variation. Gustafsson (2001) feels 
however that in modern European countries, economic variables would be more 
important than biological factors. 
3.3  Earnings Model 
Fertility levels in our model depend upon female wage rates and male earnings. 
We regress 1994 wages on 1994 characteristics and then simulate potential wages 
for each person each year based upon the characteristics of that year. This 
imputation is unlikely to have a strong effect on results as Heckman and Walker 
(1990) finds that the correlation between current and future wages is very high.   
In both cases, we use a standard earnings equation to estimate female wage rates 
and male earnings, utilising the Heckman procedure to account for sample 
selection bias (Heckman, 1979). In the earnings equation, we use education level 
and employment experience. The “Heckman” method adjusts the coefficients in 
the model in order to account for any selection bias associated with the fact that 
we only observe earnings for those who work. In addition to education and 
experience, duration of marriage as well as parental and spouse characteristics are 
used for identification. Because simulated earnings depend upon 1994 earnings 
levels, the predicted earnings will only capture changes in earnings levels due to 
shifts in education and employment patterns and not wealth changes due to 
productivity gains generally in the economy. We would therefore expect the 
impact of these variables to be underestimated. 
Table 4 reports the main features of the female wage equation. The model has a 
standard human capital model structure with positive returns to education and an 
inverted u-shape return to experience. We also include a variable accounting for 
periods out of the labour market to incorporate the impact of the depreciation of 
human capital during these periods. The coefficient on this variable is negative 
and significant. 
  103.4  Shadow Price of a Child 
We now consider the impact of this earnings model on the opportunity cost of 
having a child. We saw above that if the shadow price of a child is lower, later in 
life, then birth will be delayed. If we assume that the first three terms of the 
shadow price are constant across the life-cycle, then because the inter-temporal 
substitution is based upon the ratio of shadow prices, without much loss in 
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We now consider a woman who works for her entire lifetime except for a period 
not participating in the labour market to raise children. Assume that this period 
amounts to one year at the time of birth. Therefore  is equal to 1. We assume 
that productivity growth is the same rate as the discount rate. This means that 
discounted future wages with growth are the same as undiscounted future wages 
without growth. Therefore the opportunity cost of parental childcare for this 
period is   in time t. The loss of human capital due to this year out of the labour 
market is  .  
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In figure 3 we illustrate the components of the shadow price of having a child as 
per equation (9’). Graph (a) plots the earnings profiles of those with lower 
secondary, upper secondary and university education, where the scale is based 
upon earnings of a lower secondary educated woman at age 16 being equal to 100. 
The profiles have the characteristic inverted u shape resulting from the quadratic 
term in the earnings function. While for particular cohorts, earnings tend to rise 
over time, albeit at a declining rate, if we assume that the average growth rate is 
the same as the discount rate, then the discounted cohort specific earnings profile 
is the same as the cross-sectional age earnings profile. Discounted earnings 
represent the opportunity cost of parental childcare.  
In graph (b) we consider the impact each year of having one year less experience, 
combined with the corresponding depreciation of human capital due to being out 
of the labour market. Because of our assumption that women work from the time 
they leave education until retirement (except for the year taken out to care for a 
child), the experience of a higher educated person is less than a lower educated 
person for each age level. Because of this, the proportional loss in human capital 
due a year spent out of the labour market to care for a child, is greater for the 
higher educated person. Therefore, combined with the fact that earnings grow 
faster for higher educated, the human capital loss due to a period in parental 
childcare grows at a faster rate for higher educated women. Also, because the 
proportional human capital loss falls with experience, the slopes of these curves 
decline with experience and eventually go negative after the age of 50.  
  11The total human capital loss by age of child birth is defined in graph (c). For a 
birth at time t, the total human capital loss is defined as the sum of the human 
capital loss per annum from time t+1 to T. This falls with age of child birth as the 
potential future human capital loss is smaller as the remaining time to retirement 
is shorter. To highlight the relatively different slopes for different education 
levels, this graph reports the total capital loss with respect to the loss due to 
having a child at age 22. We note that higher education levels have higher total 
human capital losses at each time t relative to the total capital loss at age 22 
compared with other education levels. This is because of the relatively steeper 
falling human capital loss per annum curve. 
Combining in plot (d) the total human capital loss (c) with the opportunity cost of 
parental childcare (a), we produce the shadow price of a child. Because what is 
relevant to the marginal rate of inter-temporal substitution is the ratio of the 
shadow prices, we normalise each education level specific curve to be 100 at age 
22. We see here that the slope declines for each education level. This means that it 
gets relatively cheaper to have a child later in life – however this needs to be 
compared to the lower total utility from having a child later. We also notice that 
the slope is steeper for lower educated. In other words, the cost of having a child 
falls at a faster rate for lower educated women, than for higher educated women. 
The absolute cost however, at each age of potential child birth, is much lower for 
less educated women than for higher educated women. Therefore, while the cost 
may fall faster, it is from a much lower base. 
In plot (e) we consider the impact of utilizing a simpler human capital 
specification as utilized by Walker (1995). Here we see that excluding the impact 
of decline rates of return to experience and ignoring depreciation effects, we find 
that the shadow price rises with age, corresponding to the results of Walker’s 
theoretical model. In plot (f), we incorporate the impact of depreciation and see 
that adding depreciation to the model increases the cost of parental child care on 
future human capital, reversing the slope observed in plot (e) although less steep 
than in plot (d). This model therefore corresponds to the finding in table 2 that 
higher educated women delayed first birth more then less educated women. While 
in the graphs, we considered a gap of one year, the impact of longer periods out of 
the labour market is to strengthen the direction of these effects. 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS I – SURVIVAL FUNCTIONS 
In this section we plot the survival functions for different order births. These 
functions record the average probability of not having a child of a particular birth 
order at particular ages. In figure 4, we consider the survival functions of first 
births. These functions are estimated over all years of the data, are reported 
separately for different education levels, and are reported (in the case of first 
births) for three different time-scales, age, duration since leaving education and 
since marriage. 
When we use age as the time scale, we see that at the age of 40, the proportion of 
higher educated people with a first birth is lower for lower education levels, 
  12indicating that higher educated women are more likely not to have a child. The 
graph of the lower educated women is lower than that of the higher educated, 
indicated that lower educated women have their first child earlier. When we use 
the duration since leaving education, we see that the duration to first birth 
although still higher for higher education levels, but that the differential is much 
less. When utilising the duration since marriage as the time-scale, we look only at 
the sub-sample who marry. Here we see that the proportion of those with first 
births after 10 years of marriage is similar across education levels, that the 
majority of first births occur in the first two to three years of marriage and that 
although the ordering of durations by education level is the same as for the other 
duration measures, that differential again is quite small. 
The picture for second births is similar, with those with upper secondary and 
university educations having a very similar pattern. This group have a similar 
fertility rate after 12 years of marriage to those with lower education levels, but 
that their births tend to be slightly later. However, although not reported here, 
most of this delay is due to the delay in having first births with the survival 
function when duration since last birth is used as the time-scale, the timing 
differential due to education level becomes much smaller. For third and fourth 
births fertility rates after 18 years of marriage fall with education levels with again 
higher education levels have their births slightly later. These differentials remain 
when we consider duration since last birth as the time-scale. 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS II – COX PROPORTIONAL 
HAZARD MODELS 
In this section we report the results of our duration model of fertility by birth 
order (first, second, third and later births). The models focus on women who were 
ever married, allowing us to consider the impact of being in education on the 
timing of birth. In table 5 we describe a set of Cox Proportional Hazard models of 
first births. The different models utilise different times scales 
•  Age (All Women and Married Women) 
•  Duration Since Leaving Education 
•  Duration Since Marriage 
In our proportional hazard model we report  . In other words, a unit change in 
changes the relative hazard by . If the relative hazard is greater than one, 
then the hazard increases and an event is more likely to occur earlier and if it is 





In the first model, looking at all women, we see that being in education delays the 
timing of maternity. Higher female wages, due in part to higher education or 
greater experience, also result in delayed first births. These results support the 
career-planning hypothesis that women delay having birth while in education or if 
  13they have higher potential wages. The relative sign on the female potential wage 
variable is less than 1 confirming the functional form for human capital 
accumulation in our theoretical model above that predicts a delay in birth for 
women with steeper wage trajectories. This result holds in each of the models 
considered for the timing of first order births. 
In our theoretical model, we assume perfect capital markets, in other words, the 
size of the husband’s income will not affect the timing of birth, but only operates 
through the wealth effect on the number and quality of children. If this hypothesis 
were true, then the coefficient on husband’s earnings would not be significant. 
The relative hazard for the husband’s potential earnings variable is greater than 1 
significant at the 90% level when the time-scale is age. This indicates a positive 
income effect on the timing of the first birth, so that means that the higher the 
income of the spouse, the earlier the birth. When we consider the duration since 
finishing education as the time-scale, the size of this variable is bigger and 
significant at the 95% level, however when the duration since marriage is used, 
the variable becomes insignificant. These results reject the assumption of perfect 
capital markets, supporting the income-smoothing hypothesis, but that because the 
timing of first birth and marriage may be considered joint decisions, income 
smoothing may influence the timing of birth through the timing of marriage or 
through the joint process. 
We introduce the impact of uncertainty due to unemployment through the use of 
an age and education level specific male unemployment rate. The relative hazard 
is less than 1 and is significant for the duration since leaving education time-scale 
and less so for the age time-scale. It indicates some evidence that if there is a 
higher unemployment rate, they face higher uncertainty and so the couple may 
delay having children. This variable although significant in terms of duration 
since leaving education, it becomes insignificant as we move to duration since 
marriage, indicating that like the impact of male earnings, economic uncertainty 
may have more influence on the age of marriage rather than on the age of first 
birth. 
One of the biggest differences we see between the models is in the time effects. 
We see that when we use age or duration since leaving education as the time-
scale, the coefficients are significant and decreasing in time, so that the later in the 
1970-1994 time period we get the greater the delay in fertility, even when we 
account for the effect of the other explanatory variables. However in the model for 
duration since and marriage, the coefficients on the dummies for the period 1975-
79 and 1985-89 are generally not significantly different from the 1970-74 period. 
This indicates the importance of the changing age of marriage in timing of 
childbirth.  
In table 6, we consider the timing of later order births, focusing in addition on the 
time-scale, duration since last birth. For second order births, we see that higher 
female potential wages delay births with respect to age. This is still partially the 
case for duration since leaving education and since marriage. The variable has a p-
value as low as 0.8 for the time-scale duration since last birth, but the direction of 
the effect has changed, indicating that given the time of the first birth and the 
  14income effect on the timing of the second birth may be more important, with the 
opportunity cost being accounted for by the duration to the first birth. This income 
effect can be seen when we look at the higher husband’s wages resulting in earlier 
births and for duration since education and marriage of negative impact of 
uncertainty due to male unemployment.  
For third births, female potential wages again have a significant effect, this time 
for all time-scales, higher wages resulting in delayed third births. This effect may 
be due to some degree on the degree of censoring for this population. While most 
of the population have two births, this birth order exhibits a significant proportion 
who have no more births. Except for duration since education, the income effect 
for husband’s potential earnings is not significant. Uncertainty due to male 
unemployment rates however is now highly significant. Not many variables are 
significant in the model of fourth order births. Women with higher wages on 
average have fourth order births later, but once one factors in the age of marriage 
or the timing of the third birth, this effect is not significant. Male earnings are not 
very significant but however move in the opposite direction to earlier birth orders. 
There is also some slight evidence of uncertainty having a negative effect on the 
timing of fourth order births. 
6.  Empirical Results III – Decomposing Trends 
In this section we decompose the impact of these trends on the timing of birth. 
Consider the averages of a set of variables at the start of the period (1970-1975), 
say  70 x and at the end of the period (1990-1994)  90 x .  
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  15In table 7, we report the decomposition for one time-scale, duration since leaving 
education, comparing the period 1970-74 with the period 1990-94. The results 
however are reasonably robust to this decision. Most of the change for first to 
third births over this period can be explained by the female wage effect with the 
period and cohort specific effects being more important for fourth and higher 
order births. Higher wages over time due to the rise in education levels have 
resulted in later births.  
The next most important is the impact of uncertainty. Higher unemployment rates 
for males result in later births and for later order births this is more important than 
the opportunity cost of having a child. This rejects the assumption made in our 
theoretical model about perfect capital markets and confirms that economic 
uncertainty provides the incentive to delay decisions that imply long-term 
commitments such as children. Thus the strong rise in unemployment evidenced 
between 1970 and the early 1990’s in figure 2 may have resulted in postponed 
maternity and marriage in Ireland. Evidence from Ahn and Mira (2001) also 
suggests that unemployment and a lack of stable jobs among young men has 
forced couples to delay their marriage and childrearing in  Spain, leading to a very 
low fertility rate in that country.  
Finally although the effect is quite small, increasing male income has pushed 
timing in the other direction, with those with higher wages having earlier births.  
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we drew on New Home Economics theory and specifically Walker’s 
fertility model (1995) to incorporate a career-planning hypothesis to account for 
higher educated women delaying having children. Data from the 1994 Living in 
Ireland Survey was used to quantify, using survival analysis, the timing of 
maternity in Ireland over the period 1970-1994. The principle conclusion arising 
from this analysis is that the career-planning hypothesis is supported. Being in 
education and the associated higher potential earnings were found to resulted in 
delayed first and, hence, later births. There was also some evidence that higher 
male unemployment rates resulted in delayed births as well as evidence of an 
income effect due to male earnings, indicating some support for a consumption 
smoothing hypothesis. While there is an upward trend in duration to first birth, the 
timing of marriage, once economic variables are considered, accounts for much of 
this secular trend, indicating that changes in the age of marriage has had a 
significant impact on the timing of first order births.   
The study focuses on the period before rapid economic development occurred in 
Ireland towards the end of the 1990s. Despite the large rise in incomes and falls in 
unemployment rate, the age at first birth has continued to rise, although there has 
been a recovery in the birth rate. This supports the primacy of the career-planning 
hypothesis relative to the consumption smoothing hypothesis as female 
participation rates have converged to EU levels.  
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  18TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Period and Cohort Fertility Statistics for Ireland 
Period  1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Mean Age At First Birth      25.5 25.5 26.1 26.6 27.3 27.8 
% of First Order Births  23.5  27.2 30.7 29.2 29.7 33.4 36.4 40.8 
% of Second Order Births  19.2  21.5 24.4 24.4 25.9 27.8 30.1 30.1 
% of Third Order Births  16.1  16.5 17.3 19.3 18.8 18.6 18.2 17.4 
% of Fourth Order Births  41.1 34.8 27.7 27.2 25.6 20.1 15.2 11.7 
TFR (Ireland)  4.03  3.93  3.40 3.23 2.47 2.11 1.84 1.98 
TFR (EU-15)  2.72  2.38  1.96 1.82 1.60 1.57 1.42 1.47 
Births Outside Marriage  2.2  2.7 3.7 5.0 8.5 14.6  22.3  31.2 
          
Birth  Cohort      1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 
Completed Fertility      3.4 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 
Mean Age At First Birth     25.3  24.9  24.8  25.1  25.8 
%  Childless      4.0 5.0 6.0 9.0 13.0  15.0 
% With Number of Children: 1      18.0  15.0  12.0  13.0  9.0  11.0 
% With Number of Children: 2      10.0  14.0  17.0  19.0  22.0  27.0 
% With Number of Children: 3      21.0  23.0  26.0  27.0  27.0  26.0 
% With Number of Children: 4+      47.0  43.0  40.0  34.0  28.0  22.0 
Source: European Social Statistics; Demography (Eurostat, 2002) 
  19Table 2. Educational Attainment and Mean Age of Mothers at First Birth by 
Time Period in which First Child was Born in Ireland, Britain, Germany, 
The Netherlands and Sweden 
  Time period in which first child was born 
  1950’s 1960’s 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s Total 
Ireland        
Low  25.9 26.1 25.2 24.6 25.5 25.5 
Medium 26.5  27.1  26.3 26.2 27.3 26.6 
High  *  28.0 27.2 27.9 28.7 27.8 
Total  26.0 26.4 25.6 25.6 26.9 26.0 
Britain        
Low  24.7 23.9 23.8 23.6 24.2 24.0 
Medium 26.2  23.5  24.4 25.5 25.5 25.0 
High  26.5 24.8 26.0 27.1 29.2 26.6 
Total  24.9 23.9 24.2 24.5 25.4 24.5 
Germany 
(West) 
      
Low  25.2 23.9 23.3 24.9 26.4 24.6 
Medium 28.0  25.3  25.2 28.2 29.2 27.5 
High  26.2 25.8 27.5 28.0 29.8 28.1 
Total  25.5    24.0 23.8 25.6 27.3 25.1 
Germany 
(East) 
      
Low  22.5 22.3 22.0 22.2 23.3 22.3 
Medium 23.1  22.0  23.1 23.2 23.8 23.0 
High  *  25.6 23.1 24.8 26.0 24.5 
Total  23.2 22.7 22.4 22.9 23.8 22.8 
Netherlands        
Low  23.1 24.5 24.7 25.6 26.6 24.9 
Medium  *  25.3 25.0 25.7 28.0 26.1 
High  *  25.8 27.3 28.5 30.7 28.3 
Total  23.2 24.7 25.0 26.0 28.0 25.5 
Sweden        
Low  24.7 23.7 24.2 24.4 25.5 24.3 
Medium 25.6  23.6  24.3 25.6 26.1 24.9 
High  24.7 24.6 25.7 28.2 29.8 26.8 
Total  24.8 23.8 24.5 25.7 27.0 24.8 
Source: Gustafsson et al, (2002) and Authors’ Calculations (Ireland) – Living in Ireland Survey (1994). 
Notes.  
1.  In this table low education refers to lower secondary or lower levels of education (Junior Certificate 
in Ireland), medium education refers to high school diploma level (Leaving Certificate in Ireland 
and high education refers to tertiary level education. 
2.  * denotes small sample size. 
 
  20Table 3. Educational Attainment and Mean Age of Mothers at Second, Third 
and Later Birth by Time Period in which First Child was Born in Ireland 
  Time period in which second, third and later children was born 
Educational  Level  1950’s  1960’s 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s Total 
First Birth         
Low  25.9  26.1 25.2 24.6 25.5 25.5 
Medium 26.5  27.1  26.3 26.2 27.3 26.6 
High  *  28.0 27.2 27.9 28.7 27.8 
Total  26.0  26.4 25.6 25.6 26.9 26.0 
Second Birth         
Low  27.3  27.8 27.6 27.5 28.2 27.6 
Medium 28.2  29.2  28.6 28.6 30.2 29.0 
High  *  30.2 29.3 30.4 31.5 30.1 
Total  27.4  28.2 27.9 28.2 29.7 28.2 
Third Birth         
Low  28.3  29.7 30.1 30.3 30.5 29.9 
Medium 31.2  31.3  31.3 31.1 32.5 31.5 
High  *  31.9 31.5 32.8 33.1 32.3 
Total  28.7  30.1 30.4 30.8 31.7 30.4 
Fourth Births         
Low  29.3  31.8 32.2 32.6 32.4 31.9 
Medium 31.0  33.6  33.9 32.9 33.5 33.4 
High  *  34.3 34.2 34.7 34.3 34.3 
Total  29.5  32.1 32.7 32.8 33.1 32.3 
Source: Authors’ Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey (1994). 
Notes.  
1.  In this table low education refers to lower secondary or lower levels of education (Junior Certificate 
in Ireland), medium education refers to high school diploma level (Leaving Certificate in Ireland 
and high education refers to tertiary level education. 
2.  * denotes small sample size. 
 
  21Table 4. Female Hourly Wage Equation 1994 
1
 Coefficient  p-value 
University Education  1.024  0.000 
Upper Secondary Education  0.529  0.000 
Lower Secondary Education  0.247  0.004 
Years in Work  0.075  0.000 
Years in Work
2
-0.001  0.000 
Years out of Work  -0.019  0.000 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.175  0.010 
Constant  1.939  0.000 
    
No. of obs.  1128 
Adjusted R
2 0.405 
Source: Author’s Calculations – Living in Ireland Survey, (1994).  
  22  23
Table 5. Cox Proportional Hazard Model First Birth  
Duration Variable  Age – All 
Women 
















In Education  0.512 0.00  1.070 0.802
 
 1.128  0.669 
Female Wage  0.293 0.00  0.182 0.000 0.418 0.000 0.565 0.000 
Husbands Potential Earnings 
  
1.008 0.064 1.019 0.000 1.004 0.336 
Male Unemployment Rate     0.405 0.031 0.406 0.028 0.880  0.772 
Years 1970-1974 (Base) 
        
Years 1975-1979  0.562 0.00  0.271 0.000 0.471 0.000 0.984 0.865 
Years 1980-1984  0.335 0.00  0.091 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.817 0.087 
Years 1985-1989  0.208 0.00  0.032 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.892 0.420 
Years 1990-1994  0.132 0.00  0.011 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.796 0.182 
                  
No. of obs.  18595    5555     5401     4238    
Log likelihood  -11912    -88189    -8793    -87590    
LR Chi2  539     930     453     94    
Source: Author’s Calculations based on retrospective data 1970-1994 from the Living in Ireland Survey, 
1994.  
Note: Education dummies of the father of the mother and cohort dummies are not reported.   24 
Table 6. Cox Proportional Hazard Model of Second, Third and Fourth Births for Married Women 
  Second Birth  Third Birth 
Duration  Var.                    Age  Educ. Marr  Birth  Age  Educ.  Marr  Birth 
  Coef  p-value Coef  p-value Coef  p-value Coef  p-value Coef  p-value Coef  p-value Coef  p-value Coef  p-value 
In  Education                           1.545  0.154 0.872  0.652  0.851 0.597 1.597 0.258 1.254 0.584 1.527 0.306
Female  Wage                                  0.438 0.000 0.754 0.011 0.784 0.021 1.030 0.772 0.402 0.000 0.627 0.000 0.631 0.000 0.746 0.011
Husbands Potential Earnings  1.007                                0.108 1.020 0.000 1.005 0.201 1.007 0.088 0.998 0.633 1.009 0.070 0.999 0.825 0.999 0.773
Male Unemployment Rate  0.515  0.133                              0.328 0.012 0.686 0.399 0.587 0.209 0.172 0.001 0.121 0.000 0.321 0.036 0.299 0.023
Years 1970-1974 (Base) 
                
Years  1975-1979    0.289 0.000 0.494 0.000 0.823 0.034 0.895 0.218 0.337 0.000 0.564 0.000 0.837 0.095 0.924 0.447
Years  1980-1984                                  0.056 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.527 0.000 0.621 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.625 0.000 0.738 0.016
Years  1985-1989                                  0.015 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.452 0.000 0.501 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.399 0.000 0.475 0.000
Years  1990-1994                                  0.004 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.405 0.000 0.515 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.388 0.000 0.488 0.000
N o .   o f   o b s .                   
Log  likelihood                          4713 4625 4665 4713 7082 7006 7073 7082
LR  Chi2                  -86609 -87120 -91680 -93060 -66209 -66379 -69040 -69399
Source: Author’s Calculations based on retrospective data 1970-1994 from the Living in Ireland Survey, 1994. 
Note: Education dummies of the father of the mother and cohort dummies are not reported.  
Table 6. contd. 
 Fourth  Birth 
Duration Var.  Age     Educ.     Marr     Birth    
  Coef p-value Coef  p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
In Education  1.171 0.876 
  
1.790 0.566 2.794 0.317 
Female Wage  0.541 0.000 0.771 0.098 0.951 0.738 1.028 0.848 
Husbands Potential 
Earnings 
0.993 0.262 1.001 0.843 0.992 0.211 0.992 0.185 
Male Unemployment Rate  0.527 0.338 0.303 0.079 0.691 0.588 0.703 0.606 
Years 1970-1974  
            
Years 1975-1979 (Base)  0.240 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.597 0.000 0.733 0.015 
Years 1980-1984  0.066 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.364 0.000 0.489 0.000 
Years 1985-1989  0.014 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.246 0.000 
Years 1990-1994  0.003 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.160 0.000 
          
No. of obs.  5902  5870  5897  5902  
Log likelihood  -39800   -40100  -41180  -41290  
LR Chi2  419   271  131  110  
Source: Author’s Calculations based on retrospective data 1970-1994 from the Living in Ireland Survey, 1994. 
Note: Education dummies of the father of the mother and cohort dummies are not reported. Table 7. Decomposition of Percentage change in Average Hazard of Maternity 
by Birth Order 1970-74 to 1990-94. 
Birth  Order  1 2 3 4 
Female Wage 
91.2 67.3 61.6 26.7 
Male Earnings 
-0.5 -0.3 -1.0 -0.1 
Male Unemployment Rate 
1.4 6.4 10.7  7.1 
Time (Year and Cohort) 
7.8  26.6 28.7 66.3 
Total 
    
 
8.7  10.7 13.1 14.7 
Ave. Dur. Since Leaving Ed. for Population in 1970-74 
11.8 13.9 17.0 19.8 
Ave. Dur. Since Leaving Ed. for Population in 1990-94 
8.3  10.1 12.5 14.2 
Ave. Dur. Since Leaving Ed. for those with births in 1970-74
10.6 12.8 14.9 15.6 
Ave. Dur. Since Leaving Ed. for those with births in 1990-94
91.2 67.3 61.6 26.7 
Source: Author’s Calculations based on retrospective data 1970-1994 from the Living in Ireland Survey, 1994. 
Notes:  
1.  The hazard is calculated for average characteristics in the period 1970-74 and the period 1990-94. Each 
row represents the change in the contribution to the change average value of the variable to the change 
in the average hazard rate. 
2.  The time-scale used is duration since leaving education. 

































Figure 1. Age-Specific Fertility Rate 1965-94 
  27 Figure 2. Mean Age at Birth, Education Level and Labor Force Characteristics in Ireland, 1970-2001 
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Sources: European Social Statistics: Demography (Eurostat, 2002); Author’s Calculations;.and (d) Statistical Yearbook (CSO: 1975-1997), The Trend of Employment and 
Unemployment (CSO: 1979-1988), Statistical Bulletin (CSO: 1979-2002), Labour Force Survey (CSO: 1979-2001). Figure 3. Components of Shadow Price Calculation of Timing of Birth by Education Level 
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(d) Shadow Price (Age 22 = 100)- With Quadratic 













(f) Shadow Price (Age 22 = 100) - No Quadratic 













(e) Shadow Price (Age 22 = 100) - No Quadratic 










Source: Author’s Calculations. Note:  Univ – University Educated; Upsec – Upper Secondary Educated; Losec – Lower Secondary Educated and below. For Formula for shadow price and components, 
see equation (13’) in text. 
  29 Figure 4. Survival Functions of Not Giving a Birth by Birth Order for for (a) Age (b) by Duration Since Leaving Education 
and (c) Duration Since Marriage by Education Level by Education Level 
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Source: Author’s Calculations. Note: Univ – University Educated; Upsec – Upper Secondary Educated; Losec – Lower Second y Educated and below.
 30Appendix. Means of Variables 
  All  Female Work-Hist.  Male Work-Hist.  1970  1994 
B i r t h  N u m b   e r 1 3 4 +1 3+       2 2 4  
Sample Size  45000 37001  31147  239 135 148 233 188 197 340 541 
Age     
       
     
33.2 33.2  33.0  27.9 25.8 30.4 32.1 30.4 32.0 34.9 37.9
Duration since leaving education  17.1  16.6  16.3  9.5 11.5 14.1 16.4 11.9 14.5 17.4 21.2 
Duration since leaving education squared  351.6 325.9  313.7  110.6 157.9 223.1 291.9 177.9 242.9 336.4 479.6 
Duration since marriage  8.4  9.1  9.5  1.7 4.2 6.4 9.5 3.6 6.9 11.4 15.5 
Duration since marriage*University 
Educated  0.7 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.7 1.4
Duration since marriage squared  114.9 125.6  130.4  7.8 25.3 49.3 101.5 28.3 71.8 154.4 266.4 
Currently In Education  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age at Marriage  24.8  24.6  23.2  24.1 23.7 24.0 22.6 23.9 23.6 23.3 22.2 
Duration Since Last Birth  3.5  3.7  3.7  0.0 2.2 2.7 2.4 0.0 4.5 6.0 6.1 
Duration Since Last Birth Squared  26.3  28.1  27.5  0.0 8.2 11.4 8.7 0.0 38.7 55.5 55.1 
Cumulative Number of Children  2.4  2.5  2.4  0.0 1.0 2.0 4.1 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.9 
University Educated  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.23 0.13 0.15 0.10 
Duration in Work  4.54  4.54  4.82  0.49 0.25 0.22 0.15 10.39 9.92 9.96 7.68 
Expected Wage Rate    1.51  1.53  1.49 1.45 1.43 1.34 1.88 1.74 1.73 1.59 
Time *Expected Wage Rate    19.1  20.3  0 0 0 0 45.0 41.8 41.5 38.2 
Expected Husband Earnings      1375  1290 1294 1295 1310 1550 1484 1516 1450 
Husband Expected Employment      0.53  0.48 0.46 0.41 0.35 0.69 0.67 0.62 0.54 
Expected Employment    0.35  0.35  0.58 0.31 0.20 0.10 0.80 0.59 0.48 0.39 
Proportion of Work History in Work    0.43 0.45 0.51 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.90 0.75 0.61 0.41
Husband University Educated      0.15  0.13 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.19 0.17 0.15 
Husband Upper Secondary Educated      0.17  0.14 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.34 0.22 0.29 0.17 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey, 1994. 
 